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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PANDY J. SORENSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
\ Case No. 87-0150-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, §78-2a-3 (2) (c) (Pepl Vol. 9, 1987 ed.) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court ot Appeals. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction entered 
in the Washington County Ninth Circuit Couit Criminal Case No. 
87-0190. The Defendant was convicted of the crine of possession cf 
an alcoholic beverage by a minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of U.C.A., 1953, §32A-12-13. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the presence of an alcoholic beverage within the body 
cf a person under the age of 21, without any evidence as to how, 
when or where the beverage came into the person's body, constitute 
possession of the alcoholic beverage by that individual in violatioi 
of U.C.A., 1953, S32A-12-13. 
2. Does evidence presented at trial that a person under 2'. 
appeared to have the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breatl 
immediately upon exiting his automobile at 1000 East and College 
Park Apartments in St. George, Utah, within fifteen (15) miles of a 
state border immediately accessible by interstate freeway, create a 
presumption that the alcoholic beverage had been purchased, 
possessed or consumed in the State of Utah or in violation of Utafr 
Law? 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
"No person shall....be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law;" 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
"No State shall.,, deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law;" 
Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501: 
" (1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt , li. 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words 'element of the 
offense1 mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, ci results 
of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a conviction of possession of an 
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alcoholic beverage by a minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation 
in §32A-12-13 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) following a 
non-jury trial held March 20, 1982 (Record at 11). The Defendant 
did not appear at trial (Record at 11) . However, he was represented 
by counsel. The facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
are: 
1. On the 18th day of January, 1987, Officer Dennis Bailey of 
the St. George Police Department observed the Defendant driving his 
vehicle from 1000 East 100 South along 1000 East in a Southerly 
direction toward College Park Apartments (Transcript of trial, 
hereinafter "Transcript" at 4) . The Officer paced the vehicle at 
38-40 m.p.h., in excess of the posted speed limit (Transcript at 
4). The Defendant's vehicle arrived at the College Park Apartments 
at approximately 1:55 in the morning (Transcript at 5). The 
Defendant was the individual confronted by the Officer at that time 
and was under the age of 21 (Transcript at 6). 
2. The Officer detected a strong odor of alcohol as he 
approached where the Defendant was standing by the door of the 
vehicle. The Defendant gave his consent to the Officer to search 
the vehicle. The Officer found no alcohol. After the search the 
Officer noticed that the "strong odor of alcohol" was coming from 
Defendant's breath (Transcript at 6). 
3. While the Officer was issuing the citation to the Defendant 
for possession of alcohol, the Defendant became angry at something 
and began using foul language. At that point he was arrested and 
transported to the St. George City Police Department (Transcript at 
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7). His mood fluctuated up and down. At first he would become call 
and want to talk to the officers and then he'd become hyper, excitec 
and angry (Transcript at 7). 
4. The Officer testified over Defendant's objection that ii 
his opinion the Defendant was under the influence or affected b} 
alcohol that he had consumed (Transcript at 8) . 
5. The Officer acknowledged that he could not tell when the 
alcohol that he detected on the Defendant's breath had been consumed 
(Transcript at 9) and acknowledged that, in his opinion, the alcohol 
had probably not been consumed within the last 10 minutes 
(Transcript at 9). He also acknowledged that he did not know where 
the alcohol had been consumed (Transcript at 9) and that he had not 
seen the Defendant consume, purchase or possess any alcohol 
(Transcript at 9) . 
6. The partdes stipulated that there is a state border located 
within 15 miles of St. George, the City where the Defendant Was 
arrested (Transcript at 10) . 
7. Following the presentation of evidence and argument by 
counsel, the Court concluded that "since he [the Defendant] 
apparently did not state to the Officer that 'I drank legally 
outside the [State]' and since he's not here to make that claim, the 
natural inference the Court feels and the statistical probability, 
viewing the case in the context of all similarly situated cases, is 
that the drinking occurred m or about the area where the arrest 
occurred (Record at 19-20). The Court based its finding of guilt en 
that "factual assumption" (Record at 20)• 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents for review an issue that has been presented 
and decided by the Supreme Court ot the State of Washington and the 
Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, In both of those states, the 
Courts concluded that the mere presence of a narcotic substance or 
alcohol in a person's bloodstream does not constitute possession 
within the meaning of their statute prohibiting either possession of 
a controlled substance or possession of an alcoholic beverage by a 
minor• 
The presence of alcohol on the Defendant's breath at 2:00 a.m. 
in the City of St. George, a municipality located within 15 miles of 
a state border accessible by interstate freeway, while 
circumstantial evidence of possession of alcohol by the Defendant, 
is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The statute requires that the State prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant either purchased, consumed, 
or possessed an alcoholic beverage within the State of Utah. Since 
it is just as probable as not that the alcoholic beverage was 
consumed outside the State of Utah, the State failed to meet m s 
burden and the Court erred when it adjudged the Defendant guilty of 
the offense charged. 
The Trial Court apparently concluded that: the circumstances of 
this case were such that the burden of proof was shifted to the 
Defendant to explain why there was the smell of an alcoholic 
beverage on his breath ignoring statutory and case law which 
specifically precludes shifting the burden of proof in a criminal 
-5-
case. This Court decided in State v. Turner, 57 U.A.R. 18 (Court o 
Appeals May 4, 1987) that it was an unconstitutional intrusion intc 
a Defendant's rights to due process of law to instruct a jury thai 
possession of recently stolen property without an explanation by the 
Defendant as to the circumstances concerning the possession of the 
recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of theft. The 
Trial Court's ruling in this case, requiring a Defendant to explain 
the circumstances leading up to the presence of an alcoholic 
beverage on his breath and, in essence, prove his innocence, suffers 
from the same defect as did the jury instruction struck down by this 
Court in the Turner case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MEPE PRESENCE OF AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE IN THE BODY OF A 
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE DOES NOT ESTABLISH PROOF, BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT THE PERSON POSSESSED OR CONSUMED THE 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW. 
For an individual to be found to have "possessed" something, 
including an alcoholic beverage or a narcotic substance, there must 
be more presented to the trier of fact than the mere evidence that 
the substance or beverage was in the person's bloodstream or 
digestive system. In State vs. Hornaday, 713 P. 2d 71 (Washington 
1986) the Defendant, a juvenile, appeared to be intoxicated, 
according to the arresting police officer. The officer approached 
the Defendant and could smell a strong odor of alcohol on his 
breath. When the Defendant produced a driver's license which 
indicated that he was only 20 years old, the officer arrested the 
Defendant for illegal consumption or possession of alcohol. The 
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Defendant was subsequently charged with illegal consumption or 
possession of alcohol and was convicted. The Supreme Court of the 
State of Washington was called upon to determine whether the 
presence of alcohol in the Defendant's bloodstream constituted 
either possession or consumption of an alcoholic beverage, in the 
absence of testimony that the Defendant had possessed or consumed 
alcohol other than as was evidenced by the presence of an alcoholic 
beverage in his body. The Court discussed separately the meaning of 
the word "possession" as it applied to the statute and the meaning 
of the word "consumed." The Court concluded that "the language 
'possession of intoxicating liquor1 is 'clear, plain and 
unambiguous1." 713 P.2d at 74. A Defendant "possesses" a controlled 
substance when the Defendant knows of the substance's presence, the 
substance is immediately accessible, and the Defendant exercises 
"dominion or control" over the substance. The Court concluded that 
"once [alcohol] is within a person's system, the power of a person 
to control, possess, use or dispose of it is at an end." 713 P. 2d 
at 75. Since the essential element of control was absent, the Court 
concluded that the Defendant could not possess alcohol within the 
meaning of the statute aiiter the alcohol was within the person's 
bodily system. The Court went on to conclude that, under the 
relevant statute in the State of Washington authorizing arrest by a 
police officer for a crime committed in his presence, it was 
necessary to establish present possession and not merely past 
possession of the alcoholic beverage. 
In discussing the relevance of the term "consume" within the 
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meaning of the statute, the Court concluded that, as with the tern 
"possession," "consume" does "not include the stage at which the 
liquor has already been swallowed but is still being assimilated b^ 
the body." 713 P.2d at 76. The Court concluded that "consume" is 
not an ongoing process and went on to state that "the minor who has 
legally consumed liquor with the consent of parents, for legal 
religious purposes, or legally just across the state line has not 
committed a crime and does not commit one by coming near a police 
officer before the alcohol in his blood has been dispelled." 713 
P.2d. at 77 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas in the case qf State 
vs. Flinchpaugh, 659 P2d 208 (Kansas 1983), decided that the 
presence of an otherwise illegal substance in a person's bloodstream 
did not constitute proot beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
substance had been possessed in violation of the applicable statute. 
In that case, the Defendant had been involved in an automobile 
collision. As a result of the impact, the driver of the other car 
had died and the Defendant had suffered injuries which required that 
she be taken to the hospital. She consented to the drawing of her 
blood. Samples of the blood were sent to the State Department of 
Health and revealed the possession of cocaine in the blood samples. 
The State had no direct evidence as to how or why the chemicals were 
introduced into the Defendant's system. The State charged the 
Defendant with possession of a controlled substance, cocaine; based 
solely on the result of the blood test. The Trial Court granted a 
Motion to Dismiss. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Trial 
Court's dismissal, concluded that: 
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"Once a controlled substance is within a personfs system, 
the power of the person to control, possess, use, dispose 
of, or cause harm is at an end. The drug is assimilated by 
the body. The ability to control the drug is beyond human 
capabilities. The essential element of control is absent. 
Evidence of a controlled substance after it is assimilated in a 
person's blood does not establish possession or control of 
that substance'1 (659 P.2d at 211). 
The Court went on to conclude that while discovery of a drug in a 
person's blood is circumstantial evidence tending to prove 
prior possession of the drug, it is "not sufficient evidence to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court reasoned that 
it was necessary to have other, corroborating evidence, combined 
with the positive results of a blood test, in order to be sufficient 
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, depending on the 
probative value of the corroborating evidence (659 P.2nd at 212.) 
As in the cases cited, there was no evidence presented at trial 
of this matter that the Defendant exercised any control or dominion 
over an alcoholic beverage within the State of Utah. The sole 
evidence on which the prosecution based their case was the presence 
of the smell of an alcoholic beverage on the Defendant's breath. 
Even assuming that the Defendant did have an alcoholic beverage in 
his body at the time of the arrest, the piesence of that alcoholic 
beverage did not constitute possession of an alcoholic beverage by a 
minor. It would only be circumstantial evidence that the Defendant 
had, in the past, consumed or possessed an alcoholic beverage. That 
circumstantial evidence would not, by itself, be sufficient to 
establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt m the absence of 
corroborating evidence. This is so especially where the arrest 
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occurred at the location indicated—an area immediately accessible 
by interstate freeway leading directly to a State line located just 
a few miles away—and there was no evidence presented to establish 
that the prior possession or consumption had occurred other than in 
the neighboring state. 
II. EVIDENCE THAT A PERSON, UNDER THE AGE OF 21, HAD THE ODOR 
OF AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE ON HIS BREATH, IMMEDIATELY UPON EXITING HIS 
AUTOMOBILE AT 1000 EAST AND COLLEGE PARK APARTMENTS IN ST. GEORGE, 
UTAH, DOES NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION TEAT THE PERSON CONSUMED, 
POSSESSED, OR PURCHASED AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
OR IN VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW. 
An essential element of the crime for which the Defendant is 
charged is that the crime be committed within the State of Utah. 
The Defendant must have possessed, purchased or consumed an 
alcoholic beverage within the State of Utah in order to be guilty of 
the crime charged. In this case, there was insufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support the finding of the Trial Court that 
the Defendant had possessed, consumed or purchased an alcoholic 
beverage within the State of Utah. 
While the presence of an alcoholic beverage in the Defendant's 
system is certainly circumstantial evidence that, at some time in 
the past,, the Defendant had purchased, consumed cr possessed an 
alcoholic beverage, that evidence, by itself, is not sufficient to 
warrant conviction for consuming, possession or purchasing an 
alcoholic beverage within the State of Utah. The location of the 
commission of the crime is an essential element of the offense. In 
this case, the prosecution presented no evidence as to the location 
of the commission of the alleged crime. The parties stipulated that 
the location of the arrest was within approximately 15 miles of a 
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state border. The Officer testified that he could not tell when the 
Defendant had consumed the alcoholic beverage that he detected on 
the Defendant's breath or where he had consumed it. In fact, the 
Officer acknowledged that, in his opinion, it would be unreasonable 
to assume that Defendant had consumed the alcoholic beverage within 
the last ten minutes. 
In order to justify convicting Defendant ot the crime charged, 
the trier of fact would have to assume that the crime was committed 
within the State of Utah. However, the trier of fact is not 
permitted to assume any essential element of the offense charged. 
Each and every element of the offense has to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the Defendant can be convicted of the crime 
charged. U.C.A. §76-1-501. The Trial Court went around that hurdle 
by imposing upon the Deiendant a presuraption based en an unspecified 
"substantial possibility" or "probability" (Transcript at 19, Record 
at 19). The Trial Court concluded that, in light of other 
circumstances, the Defendant had the burden of explaining why there 
was an alcoholic beverage on his breath at the time of his arrest in 
order to negate the presumption created. That position taken by 
the Trial Court and the prosecuting attorney is clearly at odds with 
this Court fs recent decision in the case of State vs. Turner, 57 
U.A.R. 18 (Court of Appeals May 4, 19S7) and with Article I, Section 
7, of the Utah State Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
In State v. Turner,, the Defendant was arrested for possessing 
stolen property. The only evidence against him was that he had in 
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his possession what appeared to be recently stolen property. The 
Defendant did not offer an explanation as to why he had the property 
in his possession and did not testify at trial. The jury was 
instructed that the Defendant's possession of recently stoler 
property without a sufficient explanation constituted prima facie 
evidence that he was guilty of stealing the property. This Court 
affirmed the Supreme Court's prior decisions in State v. Chambers/ 
709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 
19 85) in striking down that instruction and holding it 
unconstitutional as a denial of due process under the fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The State has the burden of proving each element of its case by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court concluded that it is a 
clear violation of the Constitutional protections afforded the 
Defendant in a criminal case to impose upon him the affirmative duty 
to prove his innocence, that is, rebut a presumption created by the 
mere possession of stolen property. 
Although there were no jury instructions in this case, the 
error committed by the Trial Court is every bit as significant as 
that discussed in the Turner case. The Trial Court in this case 
erred when it imposed upon the Defendant the responsibility of 
rebutting a presumption supposedly created by the mere presence of 
an alcoholic beverage en the Defendant's breath, A Trial Court 
cannot relieve the State of its responsibility to prove each and 
every element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt by 
structuring a presumption of this nature. 
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The Defendant in this case was entitled to due process of law. 
The Trial Court's presumption of guilt, based upon the mere presence 
of an alcoholic beverage on the Defendant's breath, without proof 
that the crime had been committed or where the alleged crime had 
been committed, infringed on the Defendant's rights to due process 
of law in violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. A Defendant is not required to prove that a 
crime was not committed or was not uuuiraitted within the State of 
Utah. The State has the affirmative obligation to prove that it 
was. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's conviction in this case resulted from a denial 
of his rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Federal Constitution. The 
mere presence of an alcoholic beverage in the Defendant's system 
does not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt of present 
possession, consumption, or purchase of an alcoholic beverage. Once 
the alcoholic beverage has been introduced into the body, it is no 
longer subject to possession or consumption by the Defendant. To 
support a conviction of this charge there must be some evidence as 
to how, when and/or where the alcohol was introduced into the 
person's body. 
The mere presence of an alcoholic beverage in the Defendant's 
system is not sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the 
conviction of guilt in this case. The prosecution has the burden of 
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proving each and every element of the offense by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. One of the elements is that the crime be 
committed within the State of Utah. In this instance, there was no 
proof whatsoever on that essential element. The Trial Court 
provided that element by creating a presumption which would require 
the Defendant to prove that the crime was not committed within the 
State of Utah. That is clearly in violation of the Defendant's 
rights to due process as protected by the State and Federal 
Constitutions and in violation of U.C.A. § 76-1-501. 
The conviction of the Defendant in this case is clearly 
of his constitutional and statutory rights to due process of lav/. 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and, in light of the 
evidence presented, a Judgment of Acquittal entered. 
DATED this tfy day of MMMWA^ 19 87. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid -chis day of , 
1987, to: 
W. Brent Langston 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney for Respondent 
G. Michael Westfall 
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ADDENDUM 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
SORENSON, Randy J. ) 
Defendant. ] 
> ORDER DENYING 
> MOTION 
> AND 
> FINDINGS 
| Criminal No. 871000190 
Defendant was found guilty of Minor Consuming Alcohol 
on March 20, 1987, after a trial. His attorney, Mr. Westfall 
appeared, but Defendant did not. Defendant was fined $165, since 
it was a third offense of Minor Consuming Alcohol. 
The "Objection to Judgment of Conviction" is overruled, 
since there is no provision in the rules for it. 
The Court makes the following findings in support of 
judgment: 
1. The Defendant had been stopped by the officer 
at 2 a.m., speeding, near the College Park 
Apartments. 
2. Defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on 
his breath, which the officer thought was 
beer. 
3. Upon his arrest, Defendant became angry and 
used foul language. Then his mood would 
fluctuate and he would talk reasonably. 
4. Defendant never claimed that he had consumed 
the alcohol in another state, either to the 
officer at the time of arrest, or in the 
trial, which he didn't attend- This suggestion 
was raised only in argument of his counsel. 
the Court finds that it would have been natural 
and likely for him to have raised that point 
at the time of arrest, had it been true. 
5. Considering all the evidence, which includes 
the hour of arrest, the place of arrest, the 
direction of travel at the time of speeding, 
and the absence of any allegation the drinking 
occurred outside Utah, under circumstances in 
which it would have been natural to raise that 
point, if true, the Court concludes that the 
statistical possibility that the drinking in 
this case occurred outside Utah is so slight 
as to not meet the threshhold for reasonable 
doubt. 
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Dated this day of March, 1987, 
Robert F. Owen> Judge 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
ORDER DEYNING MOTION AND FINDINGS was delivered to the following: 
Mr. Brent Langston, Deputy 
Washington County Attorney 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
on this ^ < ' day of March, 1987. 
Mr.jS. Michael Westfall 
GAILIAN & WESTFALL 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84770 
{ Kjiix ti^-^ncfrCL 
Cler F 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
County, ST. GEORGE Department WASHINGTON 
STATE OF UTAH 
VS. 
SORENSON, Randy J . 
Plaintiff 
Defendant j 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT 
C r i m . No. 871000190 
APPEARANCES: QDefendant 
CONVICTION: [ j B y J u r 7 
[x] Counsel [x"] Prosecutor Q l n Absentia 
xJBy Court Q P l e a of Guilty or No Contest 
OFFENSE: Count 1. Minor Possess ion AlcoholgsgagxgxClass B. Misdemeanor 
Defendant i s adjudged g u i l t y of the above offense(s) and sentenced: 
( third alcohol convict ion) 
86-CR-1286, 86-CR-1578 
SENTENCE 
X FINE.UCA 77-19-1. Defendant is ordered to pay a fine, 1.$ 165.00 
The fine is to be paid as follows: 2.$ 
3-$ 
TOTAL: $TF57UTT 
The fine must be fully paid by this review date: 
If not paid, defendant is ordered to appear in court on that date. 
D JAIL.UCA 77-19-1. Defendant is sentenced to jail, 1. 
The sentences are to run flconcurrently. 2." 
Sentence begins on 
rn consecutively. 
TOTAL: 
jiays 
[days 
jiays 
"days 
Q ] SUSPENDED: The court suspends | [CONMITMENT: The sheriff is 
days of the jail term on directed to take custody of 
the conditions checked below. 
and 
detain the defendant until the 
jail term is served or until the 
sum of $ is paid. 
.• PROBATION.UCA 77-18-1. Defendant is placed on probation for 
months on the following conditions: 
1. The probation is |jsupervised f"1unsupervised. 
Defendant will sign a probation agreement and comply with it. 
Defendant will report to probation officer when required. 
Defendant will violate no law during probation. 
Defendant will waive fourth amendment rights and will subject 
himself to search at reasonable times and places. 
Defendant will pay the fine in full before the review date. 
Defendant will make restitution of $ 
THIS COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION TO MAKE FURTHER ORDERS. 
o APPEAL. Defendant was advised of the right to a 
within 30 days after entry of judgment. 
Date of sentence March 20, 1987 
IIIK^F&> Judge 
